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Abstract. Blind signatures are a useful ingredient to design secure sophisti-
cated systems like electronic voting or sensitive applications like e-cash. Multi-
users signature schemes, like ring or group signatures, are also a useful tool to
provide to such systems some properties like scalability, anonymity, (dynamic)
group structure, revocation facilities. . . We propose in this article a simple blind
ring signature scheme based on pairings on algebraic curves. We formally prove
the security (anonymity, blindness and unforgeability) of our scheme in the
random oracle model, under quite standard assumptions.
Keywords: blind ring signatures, e-cash systems, provable security.
1 Introduction
Blind signatures were introduced by Chaum [13]. They allow a person to get a message
signed by another party without revealing any information about the message to this
other party. Blind signatures have been intensively studied since their birth. A precise
security model is provided in Pointcheval and Stern’s paper [20]. Possible applications
of blind signatures can be found in electronic auctions and electronic voting systems.
However, the original motivation for the use of such signatures came from e-cash and
untraceable payments. Roughly speaking, an electronic coin corresponds to a certain
amount of money and it is blindly signed by a bank (therefore, the bank does not know
the true value of the coin). It is then withdrawn from the bank, spent by a user, and
deposited by a shop.
To make this system more scalable by supporting many banks (to fit with real
life scenarios), and to possibly add some other properties like strong anonymity of
the signing banks, non linkability of two different signatures, revocation facilities, etc.,
Lysyanskaya and Ramzan introduced the concept of blind group signatures [17], which
combines the concepts of blind signatures and group signatures. Group signatures allow
any member of a group to sign a document in such a way that a verifier can confirm
that the signature comes from the group, but he does not know which member of
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the group actually signed the document. The protocol allows for the identity of the
signer to be discovered, in case of disputes, by a designated group authority that has
some auxiliary information. Group signatures have been introduced by Chaum and van
Heyst [14]. Like blind signatures, lots of schemes arose in the literature and one can
mention Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye and Tsudik’s scheme [2] and Boneh, Boyen and
Shacham’s pairing-based scheme [8] among the most promising and efficient protocols.
The security model for group signatures has been finally properly defined by Bellare,
Micciancio and Warinschi in their paper [3]. Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest,
Shamir and Tauman [21], are somehow similar to group signatures, but with some
important differences: (1) the group is not fixed, but chosen by the actual signer in
an ad-hoc way, just before computing the signature; (2) there is no group authority
who can recover the identity of the author of a ring signature. Ideally, anonymity
in ring and group signature schemes should be satisfied in an unconditional way: no
information about the author of a signature must be obtained, even if one has unlimited
computational resources. In this way, a signer can be sure that his identity as the author
of a signature is perfectly protected for the rest of his life. We refer the reader to Wang’s
on line bibliography on digital signature [22] for a full overview these different signature
schemes.
As we have said before, the first proposed group blind signature scheme is Lysyan-
skaya and Ramzan’s one [17], based on Camenisch and Stadler’s group signature scheme
with constant size signatures [11]. Applied to the scenario of distributed electronic
banking, a central bank behaves as the group authority and monitors the group mem-
bers, which are banks issuing e-cash. Nguyen, Mu and Varadharajan [19] also proposed
a blind variant of Camenisch and Stadler’s scheme.
Obviously, combining blind and ring signatures also brings solutions to these sce-
narios of e-banking, e-voting or e-auctions. Indeed ring signatures provide more spon-
taneity and flexibility to the design of such systems. Namely, suppose that a client
wants some bank to sign some electronic coin corresponding to a certain amount of
money; the client can choose ad-hoc a set (or ring) of potential signing banks, depend-
ing on some conditions (for example, the use that the client is going to make of the
obtained coin). If some bank in the ring accepts to sign this coin, it starts running
the interactive signing protocol with the client. The bank can therefore preserve its
anonymity inside the ring of banks, if desired; on the contrary, if it wants to publicly
show its identity, it can simply run a standard (not ring) blind signature scheme, or to
use a blind ring signature scheme where the considered ring has this bank as the only
member. Summing up, the ring can be chosen by the client or by the actual signer,
because of the interactive nature of the protocols, and this increases the number of
real-life applications of this kind of schemes.
Only few blind ring signature schemes have been proposed up to now. Chan, Fung,
Liu and Wei [12] proposed the first one in 2005. This scheme is obscure and it is
unclear who actually engages the different protocols. Furthermore, the proofs provided
in the paper are not very convincing. All these facts make us suspect that this scheme
does not satisfy some required properties such as blindness or anonymity. Finally, Wu,
Zhang, Susilo and Mu have recently described an efficient static blind ring signature
[23], with constant signature size and efficient algorithms. In this scheme, each user
knows the factorization of an RSA modulus ni = piqi. Basically, the underlying ring
signature consists for the signer, given y = gn1...nk mod N where N is a public RSA
modulus of unknown factorization, and g a generator of (Z/NZ∗)2, in proving that he
knows pi and u = g
qi
Q
j 6=i nj such that y = upi , with pi in a certain range. An external
trusted entity is therefore needed, at least in the setup phase of the system, to generate
N . Another drawback of the scheme is that anonymity only holds computationally: an
adversary with enough computational resources can factorize all the RSA moduli and
automatically obtain the identity of the author of each signature. As discussed above,
this is not desirable for some applications; maybe a bank does not want its identity to be
revealed in the future as the issuer of some (possibly controversial) e-cash. Furthermore,
the unforgeability of this scheme relies on strong (and quite debatable) assumptions like
the “extended ROS” one, and is proved in the generic group model (which is stronger
than the random oracle model). Even if the authors claim that their scheme supports
only static groups, we think that this is not true, and that the client who wants to
obtain a blind signature can choose the ring of signers in an ad-hoc way. Apparently,
authors of [23] consider only static groups to avoid some attacks against blindness. We
think that the blindness property definition only makes sense when the two considered
signatures involve the same ring of signers; this is independent of the fact that the
scheme can be employed for different rings. See more details on this point in Section
3.1, where we propose a formal and quite natural definition for the blindness property
of a blind ring signature scheme.
Our Contributions In this article, we extend Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham’s
pairing-based ring signatures [9] by adding the feature of blindness. This scheme ac-
cepts in essence the pairing-based blindness techniques described by Boldyreva in [7].
We analyze the security of the resulting blind ring signature scheme by providing first
a suitable model for the required properties: anonymity, blindness and unforgeability.
Then we prove the security of our new scheme in the random oracle model, under quite
standard assumptions, without using the generic model or ROS-like assumptions. Our
scheme suffers from the drawback that the number of computations and the size of sig-
natures grow linearly with the number of signers in the ring. This problem is recurrent
and inherent to ring signatures supporting dynamic rings, because the description of
the ring is necessary to verify a signature. This description usually consists in the set of
public keys, and so the length of the (blind) ring signature is always linear with respect
to the number of users. Techniques based on accumulators allow to obtain constant-size
ring signatures, see [15], when the same ring is used for many signatures.
Our scheme is advantageous with respect to the solutions employing group signa-
tures because it is dynamic, in the sense that the group is chosen “ad-hoc” by the client
who wants to obtain a blind signature. Furthermore, neither interaction among the set
of users nor initialization phase are required: each user generates his own secret/public
keys in an independent way. Contrary to Wu et al.’s scheme in [23], the anonymity
property is obtained in an unconditional way, which means that the identity of the
author of a signature is perfectly protected. Finally, it is easily implemented and based
on simple operations, due to the spectacular progress of pairing-based tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we recall the basics
about bilinear pairings and give the computational assumptions (of the chosen-target
problem family) which underlie our scheme, and especially the chosen-target-inverse-
CDH problem that we prove equivalent to the traditional chosen-target CDH, used in
[7] to prove the unforgeability of the blind signature scheme. Then we precisely define
in Section 3 a blind ring signature scheme and the security properties that such a
scheme should satisfy. In Section 4, we present our new scheme, and formally prove its
security. The conclusions of the work and some open problems are given in Section 5.
2 Bilinear Pairings and Computational Assumptions
In this section, we recall some basic facts about bilinear maps and introduce the com-
putational assumptions needed to prove the security of our scheme.
Definition 1. Let G be an additive group of prime order q, generated by some element
P . Let H be a multiplicative group with the same order q.
A symmetric admissible bilinear map e : G × G → H satisfies the following three
properties:
i) it is bilinear;
ii) it can be efficiently computed for any possible input pair;
iii) it is non-degenerate, which means that e(P, P ) 6= 1.
The typical way of obtaining such pairings is by deriving them from the Weil or
the Tate pairing on (hyper-)elliptic curves over a finite field (see for instance [1]).
The security of blind signature schemes is based, in general, on the hardness of the
chosen-target versions of standard computational problems, such as chosen-target RSA
problem [4] for the scheme in [13], or the chosen-target CDH problem for the scheme
in [7].
The Chosen-Target-CDH problem is defined as follows: the solver S receives as
input a pair (P, aP ), where P is a generator of G1 with prime order q, and a ∈ Zq is a
random value. The solver S has adaptive access to two oracles:
– target oracle: this oracle outputs a random element Zi ∈ G1,
– helper oracle: this oracle takes as input an element Wi ∈ G1 and outputs the
element aWi.
We say that S (qt, qh, d)-solves the Chosen-Target-CDH problem, for qt ≥ d > qh, if it
makes qt and qh queries, respectively, to the target and helper oracles, and after that
it outputs d pairs ((V1, j1), . . . , (Vd, jd)) such that:
1. all the elements Vi are different,
2. for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, the relation Vi = aZji is satisfied, where Zji is the element
output by the target oracle in the ji-th query.
To fit our purpose, we define a very similar problem, which in fact is equivalent (see
Prop. 1) to the Chosen-Target-CDH problem. This new problem, that we call Chosen-
Target-Inverse-CDH problem, is defined as follows: the solver S ′ receives as input a
pair (P ′, a′P ′), where P ′ is a generator of G1 with primer order q, and a
′ ∈ Zq is a
random value. The solver S ′ has adaptive access to two oracles:
– target oracle: this oracle outputs a random element Zi ∈ G1,
– helper oracle: this oracle takes as input an element Wi ∈ G1 and outputs the
element 1
a′
Wi.
We say that S ′ (qt, qh, d)-solves the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem, for qt ≥ d >
qh, if it makes qt and qh queries, respectively, to the target and helper oracles, and
after that if outputs d pairs ((V1, j1), . . . , (Vd, jd)) such that:
1. all the elements Vi are different,
2. for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, the relation Vi =
1
a′
Zji is satisfied, where Zji is the element
output by the target oracle in the ji-th query.
Lemma 1. The Chosen-Target-CDH problem and the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH prob-
lem are equivalent.
Proof. We show only one of the implications, since the other one can be proved in
an identical way. Let us assume, for example, that there exists S which (qt, qh, d)-
solves the Chosen-Target-CDH problem, and let us construct from it a solver S ′ which
(qt, qh, d)-solves the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem.
S ′ receives as input a pair (P ′, a′P ′), has access to its target and helper oracles, and
wants to solve the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem. To do this, it initializes the
(qt, qh, d)-solver S with input pair (P, aP ) = (a
′P ′, P ′). Note that this means a = 1/a′.
To obtain from S a solution of the Chosen-Target-CDH problem, S ′ must simulate the
environment of S, by answering all the queries that S makes to its oracles:
– target oracle: when S makes a query to this oracle, S ′ makes a query to its own
target oracle, and sends to S the obtained random element Zi ∈ G1;
– helper oracle: when S makes a query Wi to this oracle, S
′ makes the same query
Wi to its own helper oracle. By definition, the helper oracle of S
′ returns the
element
1
a′
Wi = aWi.
Therefore, S ′ sends to S this value, which is consistent with the answers of a real
helper oracle for S.
After qt and qh queries to the respective oracles, S finally outputs d pairs ((V1, j1), . . . , (Vd, jd))
such that:
1. all the elements Vi are different,
2. for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, the relation Vi = aZji =
1
a′
Zji is satisfied, where Zji is the
element output by the target oracle in the ji-th query.
Note that such a list of pairs is a valid solution for the instance (P ′, a′P ′) of the
Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem that S ′ received. Therefore, S ′ has (qt, qh, d)-
solved the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem. ut
3 Blind Ring Signature Schemes
Given an integer k, a blind ring signature scheme BRS with security parameter k
consists of the following four algorithms:
– generation of public parameters: BRS.Setup is a probabilistic algorithm which
takes as input k and outputs public parameters (which include a description of the
signature space, hash functions, etc.);
– key generation: BRS.KeyGen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input
the public parameters and outputs a signing key pair (pkj , skj) for a user Uj . The
value pkj is made public, whereas the value skj is secretly stored by user Uj .
– blind ring signature generation: BRS.Sign is an interactive 2-party protocol
which is initialized by a client C. This client chooses a message M and a ring
U = {U1, . . . , Un} of users, and engages an interaction with some of the members
Us of the ring, who can use his secret key skj as part of the input. We denote as
IC the secret inputs that client C uses, and as Tsig the values that are obtained by
the signer, during this interaction.
At the end, the private output OC for the client is a valid ring signature Σ for the
message M and the ring of users U .
– Verification of a blind ring signature: BRS.Verify is a deterministic algorithm
which takes as input a message M , a ring of users U = {U1, . . . , Un}, their public
keys pk1, . . . , pkn and bit string Σ. The output is 1 if the signature is valid, and 0
otherwise.
A blind ring signature scheme must satisfy 4 requirements:
1. Correctness means that a verifier always accepts as valid a signature that has been
properly generated by a honest client and a honest signer in the corresponding ring
of users.
2. Anonymity means that the client has no information about which member of the
ring has actually participated in the interactive blind ring signature generation.
3. Blindness intuitively means that the users in the ring obtain no information about
the message that they are actually signing for the client.
4. Unforgeability means that a client is not able to produce ` + 1 valid and different
ring signatures if he has queried for at most ` executions of the blind ring signature
protocol.
We now recall the formal definition of the two last properties.
3.1 Blindness
Blindness of a blind ring signature scheme is defined by a game played between a
challenger and an adversary. This adversary B models the dishonest behaviour of a
ring of users who try to distinguish which message (between two messages chosen by
them) is being signed in an interactive execution of the signing protocol with a client.
The game is as follows:
1. Setup: the adversary B chooses a universe U∗ of users and a security parameter
k. The challenger runs the setup protocol of the blind signature scheme with input
k, as well as the key generation protocol for each user Uj ∈ U
∗. The adversary B is
given all the resulting information: the public common parameters, the public and
secret keys of all users in the universe.
2. Challenge: the adversary chooses a ring U = {U1, . . . , Un} of users, and two
messages M0 and M1. The challenger chooses at random one bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
initializes the interactive blind ring signature protocol with message Mb and ring
U as inputs. The adversary B chooses some user Us ∈ U and plays the role of the
signer in the protocol (note that B knows the secret key of Us). At the end, the
adversary obviously obtains Tsig .
3. Guess: the adversary B finally outputs its guess b′.
We say that such an adversary B succeeds if b′ = b. A scheme has the blindness
property if, for all adversary B, its probability of success in this game is only negligibly
bigger than 1/2.
If this probability is exactly 1/2, for any adversary B, then the blindness of the
scheme is unconditional. A standard way of proving that a (ring) blind signature scheme
enjoys unconditional (or perfect) blindness is by showing that the information Tsig ,
that the signer obtains from an execution of the signing protocol, follows the same
probability distribution for any possible message. If this is proved, then in the challenge
phase of the game defined above the adversary cannot obtain from Tsig any information
about which message Mb is actually being signed, and therefore its success probability
(random guess) is limited to 1/2. This is the argument that will be use to analyze the
blindness of our blind ring signature scheme.
As opposed to what is claimed by the authors of [23], where they present some
“attacks” on the scheme in [12] and they consider only static groups for their scheme
to avoid exactly this kind of attacks, we think that a natural definition for blindness in a
blind ring signature scheme must consider only one ring of signers. Otherwise, suppose
that a member of a ring executes the protocol for two pairs (m1,U1) and (m2,U2) of
message/ring, with U1 6= U2, such that he is in both rings. Later, when seeing the
resulting valid signature for some of the two messages, this signature will in particular
contain the involved ring, and so he will be trivially able to distinguish which of the
two passed executions was indeed the one corresponding to this message. In this way,
such an adversary would break this weak notion of blindness. For this reason, we think
that our definition is the good one (in particular, in step 2 of the game above, we only
consider one ring and not two rings U0 and U1). This fact does not imply that a scheme
with this blindness property should be used also with one ring (as suggested in [23]).
The only point is that the client will only be sure that a blind signature obtained from
a ring U is perfectly hidden and untraceable with respect to all the blind signatures
obtained from this particular ring U .
3.2 Unforgeability
Unforgeability for blind ring signatures is adapted from the concept of (`, ` + 1)-
unforgeability, introduced in [20] and maintained in [4, 7] for standard blind signatures.
A (`, ` + 1, qi)-forger A against a blind ring signature scheme is thus defined by means
of the following game that it plays against a challenger:
1. Setup: the adversary A chooses a universe U∗ of users and a security parameter
k. The challenger runs the setup protocol of the blind signature scheme with input
k, as well as the key generation protocol for each user Uj ∈ U
∗. It gives to the
adversary A the resulting common parameters and the public keys pkj , and keeps
secret the secret keys skj .
2. Queries: the forger A makes different queries to the challenger:
– qi hash queries: if the scheme involves some hash function Hi which is assumed
to behave as a random oracle [5] in the security proof, then the challenger must
answer qi queries of the adversary to this oracle, providing it with consistent
and totally random values.
– ` blind ring signature queries (M,U), where U ⊂ U∗: the challenger must answer
with a valid blind ring signature Σ for this pair message/ring of users.
All these queries can be made in an adaptive way; that is, each query may depend
on the answers obtained to the previous queries.
3. Forgery: the adversary A outputs a list of ` + 1 tuples {(Mi,Ui, Σi)}1≤i≤`+1. We
say that A succeeds if:
– The ` + 1 ring signatures are valid; and
– (Mi1 ,Ui1) 6= (Mi2 ,Ui2), for all indices 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ ` + 1 such that i1 6= i2.
Note that we require the adversary to output valid blind ring signatures for different
pairs message/ring of users. That is, we do not consider as successful, for example, a
forger which asks for a valid blind ring signature for the pair (M,U) and later outputs
as forgery two valid signatures (M,U , Σ) and (M,U , Σ ′). Even if we do not consider,
with this restriction, all the kinds of adversaries against a blind ring signature scheme,
we believe that our model captures the most powerful attacks that such a scheme can
suffer in practice. In effect, consider for example the application of blind ring signatures
to electronic payments: a message (a coin) is signed by a ring of banks, and later this
coin is spent in some electronic transaction. The coin usually contains the date, a serial
number, etc., and sellers are assumed to maintain a database with the received pairs
coin/ring of banks. Therefore, an attacker which would try to spent two times the same
coin, signed by the same ring of banks, should be easily detected.
4 The New Scheme
In this section we propose a blind ring signature scheme quite simple and efficient. It
combines the ideas of the ring signature scheme which appears in [9] and the blind
signature scheme which appears in [7]. The protocols of the new scheme are described
below.
Setup and key generation. On input a security parameter k, an additive group G1 of
prime order q > 2k, generated by some element P , and a multiplicative group G2 with
the same order q are chosen, such that they admit a bilinear pairing e : G1×G1 → G2
as defined in Section 2. A hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 is also chosen. All these
parameters are common and public.
Each user Ui chooses his secret key xi ∈ Zq at random; the matching public key is
Yi = xiP ∈ G1.
Blind ring signature generation. The client who wants to obtain a blind ring signature
on a message M with respect to a ring U = {U1, . . . , Un} of users, proceeds as follows:
he chooses at random r1, . . . , rn ∈ Zq and computes the value
M¯ = H(M,U) +
n∑
i=1
riYi.
This value, along with the ring U , is sent to the members of the ring. Then some
of these members, say Us, where s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, acts as follows:
1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= s, choose ai uniformly at random in Zq , and compute
σ¯i = aiP .
2. Compute
σ¯s =
1
xs

M¯ −
∑
i6=s
aiYi

 .
3. Send to the client the tuple (σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n).
The client verifies if
e(M¯, P ) =
n∏
i=1
e(σ¯i, Yi).
If so, he computes the values
σi = σ¯i − riP, for all i = 1, . . . , n
and defines the signature of the message M made by the ring U = {U1, . . . , Un} to be
(M,U , σ1, . . . , σn).
Following the notation introduced in Section 3, we have IC = (M, r1, . . . , rn), Tsig =
(U , M¯ , {ai}i6=s, σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n) and OC = (M,U , Σ), where Σ = (σ1, . . . , σn).
Verification of a blind ring signature. The validity of the signature (M,U , σ1, . . . , σn)
is verified by checking if
e(H(M,U), P ) =
n∏
i=1
e(σi, Yi).
Correctness and anonymity of the resulting scheme directly infer from the properties
satisfied by the aforementioned schemes in [9, 7]. In particular, the anonymity property
holds unconditionally: even if a client has unlimited computational resources (which
means for example that he can obtain the secret keys of all the members of a ring) he
cannot obtain any information about which member has actually participated in the
interactive protocol to compute a blind ring signature.
Note that unconditional anonymity directly implies a different property, unlinka-
bility [16], which means that nobody (including the client) will be able to distinguish
if two different interactive executions of the blind ring signature protocol have been
performed by the same member of the ring or not. In effect, if a scheme is linkable, then
there exists a polynomial-time linking algorithm which takes as input two executions
of the blind ring signature protocol and outputs 1 if and only if the same member of
the ring has participated in both executions. If this holds, then a client with unlimited
resources who tries to break the anonymity of some execution of the protocol can act
as follows: (1) he obtains all the secret keys of the members of the ring; (2) for each
member Ui of the ring, the client uses the obtained secret key to run by himself a new
interactive execution of the blind ring signature protocol; (3) the client applies the
linking algorithm to this last execution and to the initial execution whose anonymity
he is trying to break; (4) if the output of the linking algorithm is 1 for user Ui, then
this user was the one who participated in the initial (target) execution.
We now prove that the scheme also satisfies the properties of blindness and un-
forgeability.
4.1 Blindness of the Scheme
As stated in Section 3.1, we can prove that the proposed scheme achieves unconditional
blindness if we prove that the probability distribution of the information Tsig that the
signer (the adversary in the blindness game) obtains in an execution of the signing
protocol is exactly the same for any possible message. In the case of our scheme, we
have Tsig = (U , M¯ , {ai}i6=s, σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n), where Us ∈ U = {U1, . . . , Un} is a user chosen
by the adversary.
The value M¯ = H(M,U) +
∑n
i=1 riYi follows a completely random and uniform
distribution in G1, independently of the message M , because all the integers ri ∈ Zq
are chosen uniformly and at random. For the rest of values in Tsig , either they are chosen
by the adversary or they depend on M¯ . In any case, their probability distribution does
not depend on the signed message M .
Summing up, during the challenge phase of the blindness game (see Section 3.1),
the information that the adversary obtains if the challenger chooses M0 is perfectly
indistinguishable from the information that the adversary obtains if the challenger
chooses M1. Therefore, the scheme achieves perfect blindness.
4.2 Unforgeability of the Scheme
We are going to prove that our scheme is (`, ` + 1)-unforgeable in the random oracle
model, and under the assumption that the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem is
hard to solve. We denote as q1 the number of queries that an adversary A against
the unforgeability of our scheme can make to the (random) oracle which models the
behaviour of the hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1.
Theorem 1. If there exists a (`, ` + 1, q1)-forger A against the unforgeability of our
blind ring signature scheme, which succeeds with probability ε, then there exists a
(qt, qh, d)-solver S
′ of the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem, which also succeeds
with probability ε′ ≥ ε− `+1
q
, where q is the order of the group G1, qt =, d = ` + 1 and
qh = `.
Proof. Assuming the existence of such a forger A, let us construct a solver S ′ of the
Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem. First of all, S ′ initializes A, which chooses a
security parameter k and a universe of users U∗. Solver S ′ chooses a group G1 with
primer order q > 2k which admits a bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
After that, solver S ′ asks for an instance of the Chosen-Target-Inverse-CDH problem
in the group G1. It receives a pair (P
′, Y ′), where Y ′ = a′P ′ for some random and secret
value a′ ∈ Zq ; it is also provided with access to the target and the helper oracles.
For each user Uj ∈ U
∗, solver S ′ defines his public key to be Yj = αjY
′, for some
random value αj ∈ Z
∗
q . At this point, S
′ sends to A all the common parameters q,
G1 = 〈P
′〉, G2, e, the public keys Yj of all the users Uj in the universe, and provides
it with access to a random oracle for a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1.
Hash queries: the forger A makes qh queries Qi = (Mi,Ui) to the random oracle.
Solver S ′ maintains a table TAB where it stores the relations H(Qi) = Zi that it
computes as follows: if a received query Qi = (Mi,Ui) is already in the table, S
′ sends
to A the stored value Zi. If not, S
′ makes a query to its target oracle; it receives as
answer a random element Zi ∈ G1. Then it stores the new relation H(Qi) = Zi in
TAB and sends Zi to the forger A.
Blind ring signature queries: the forger A is assumed to initialize ` times the
interactive blind ring signature protocol, playing the role of the client. Solver S ′ must
play the role of the signers and simulate the information that A should obtain in a real
execution of this protocol. The forger A sends a message M¯ ∈ G1 to be signed by a
ring U = {U1, . . . , Un}. Then solver S
′ acts as follows:
1. it chooses at random a user Us ∈ U . For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= s, the solver chooses
random values ai ∈ Zq and computes σ¯i = aiP
′;
2. it sends to the helper oracle the value
Wi =
1
αs

M¯ −
∑
i6=s
aiYi

 ,
and obtains as answer the value σ¯s =
1
a′
Wi;
3. S ′ sends to A the tuple (σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n).
In effect, this tuple perfectly simulates the information that A would have obtained
in a real execution of the protocol, since
n∏
i=1
e(σ¯i, Yi) = e(σ¯s, Ys)
∏
i6=s
e(aiP
′, Yi) =
= e

 1
a′αs

M¯ −
∑
i6=s
aiYi

 , αsa′P ′

 ∏
i6=s
e(aiP
′, Yi) =
= e(M¯, P ′)
∏
i6=s
e(−aiYi, P
′)e(aiP
′, Yi) = e(M¯, P
′).
The environment of A is thus perfectly simulated by S ′, so with probability ε the
forger A outputs `+1 tuples {(Mi,Ui, Σi)}1≤i≤`+1 of valid ring signatures such that all
the pairs (Mi,Ui) in these tuples are different. Since the hash function H is assumed to
behave as a random function, the probability that A obtains a valid ring signature for
(Mi,Ui) without asking for the value H(Mi,Ui) is 1/q. Therefore, we have that with
probability 1− `+1
q
the forger A has queried the random oracle with (Mi,Ui), for the
` + 1 forged pairs. This means that, for i = 1, . . . , ` + 1, we have that H(Mi,Ui) = Zji
where Zji are elements given to S
′ by its target oracle. The signatures are valid, so
e(H(Mi,Ui), P
′) =
∏
Uj∈Ui
e(σij , Yj) = e

 ∑
Uj∈Ui
αja
′σij , P
′


For i = 1, . . . , ` + 1, solver S ′ outputs the pair (Vi, ji), where
Vi =
∑
Uj∈Ui
αjσij
satisfies Vi =
1
a′
H(Mi,Ui) =
1
a′
Zji , as desired. Furthermore, since all the pairs (Mi,Ui)
are assumed to be different, we have that all the values Vi are also different.
Summing up, solver S ′ makes qt ≤ q1 queries to its target oracle, makes qh = `
queries to its helper oracle, and with probability ε′ ≥ ε− `+1
q
outputs d = ` + 1 valid
pairs (Vi, ji). ut
5 Conclusions
We proposed a simple and quite efficient pairing-based ring signature scheme. It is
based on Boneh et al. ring signatures and on Boldyreva’s blind signature, and naturally
inherits the advantages and drawbacks of both constructions: the number of scalar
multiplications to compute a signature grows linearly with the number of members in
the ring, as well as the number of pairing evaluations for the verification, and the size
of the signature itself. The scheme remains practical anyway, for rings of reasonable
size. Furthermore, it achieves unconditional blindness and anonymity, as opposed to
previous blind ring signature schemes. Unforgeeability of the scheme is proved in the
random oracle, under some quite standard assumptions.
An open problem would be to build a practical scheme whose unforgeability could
be proved in the standard model. Blind signatures and ring signatures without random
oracles have been recently proposed [10, 6], so maybe it is possible to combine them
and obtain blind ring signatures in the standard model. Another open question deals
with the possibility of modifying our scheme so that the size of the signatures becomes
constant, independent of the number of signers in the ring. A possible strategy to
achieve this could be the use of accumulators based on pairings [18].
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